Emergence of the Basic Structure
According to the Constitution, Parliament and the state legislatures in India have the power to make laws within their respective jurisdictions. This power is not absolute in nature. The Constitution vests in the judiciary, the power to adjudicate upon the constitutional validity of all laws.
If a law made by Parliament or the state legislatures violates any provision of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to declare such a law invalid or ultra vires. This check notwithstanding, the founding fathers wanted the Constitution to be an adaptable document rather than a rigid framework for governance. Hence Parliament was invested with the power to amend the Constitution.
Article 368 of the Constitution gives the impression that Parliament’s amending powers are absolute and encompass all parts of the document. But the Supreme Court has acted as a brake to the legislative enthusiasm of Parliament ever since independence.
The phrase ‘basic structure’ itself cannot be found in the Constitution. The Supreme Court recognised this concept for the first time in the historic Kesavananda Bharati case in 1973.
The Parliament’s authority to amend the Constitution, particularly the chapter on the fundamental rights of citizens, was challenged as early as in 1951. After independence, several laws were enacted in the states with the aim of reforming land ownership and tenancy structures. This was in keeping with the ruling Congress party’s electoral promise of implementing the socialistic goals of the Constitution[contained in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Directive Principles of State Policy] that required equitable distribution of resources of production among all citizens and prevention of concentration of wealth in the hands of a few.
Property owners — adversely affected by these laws — petitioned the courts. The courts struck down the land reforms laws saying that they transgressed the fundamental right to property guaranteed by the Constitution. Piqued by the unfavourable judgements, Parliament placed these laws in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution through the First and Fourth amendments (1951 and 1952 respectively), thereby effectively removing them from the scope of judicial review.
The Parliament added the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution through the very first amendment in 1951, as a means of immunizing certain laws against judicial review.
Under the provisions of Article 31, which themselves were amended several times later, laws placed in the Ninth Schedule — pertaining to acquisition of private property and compensation payable for such acquisition — cannot be challenged in a court of law on the ground that they violated the fundamental rights of citizens. This protective umbrella covers more than 250 laws passed by state legislatures with the aim of regulating the size of land holdings and abolishing various tenancy systems. The Ninth Schedule was created with the primary objective of preventing the judiciary – which upheld the citizens’ right to property on several occasions – from derailing the Congress party led government’s agenda for a social revolution.
Property owners again challenged the constitutional amendments which placed land reforms laws in the Ninth Schedule before the Supreme Court, saying that they violated Article 13 (2) of the Constitution.
Article 13 (2) provides for the protection of the fundamental rights of the citizen. Parliament and the state legislatures are clearly prohibited from making laws that may take away or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen. They argued that any amendment to the Constitution had the status of a law as understood by Article 13 (2).
In 1952 (Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India ) and 1955 (Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan), the Supreme Court rejected both arguments and upheld the power of Parliament to amend any part of the Constitution including that which affects the fundamental rights of citizens. Significantly though, two dissenting judges in the Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan case raised doubts whether the fundamental rights of citizens could become a plaything of the majority party in the Parliament.
The Golaknath Verdict
In 1967 an eleven-judge bench of the Supreme Court reversed its position. Delivering its 6:5 majority judgement in the Golaknath v. State of Punjab case, Chief Justice Subba Rao put forth the curious position that Article 368, that contained provisions related to the amendment of the Constitution, merely laid down the amending procedure. Article 368 did not confer upon Parliament the power to amend the Constitution. The amending power (constituent power) of Parliament arose from other provisions contained in the Constitution (Articles 245, 246, 248) which gave it the power to make laws (plenary legislative power). Thus, the apex court held that the amending power and legislative powers of Parliament were essentially the same. Therefore, any amendment of the Constitution must be deemed law as understood in Article 13 (2).
The majority judgement invoked the concept of implied limitations on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. This view held that the Constitution gives a place of permanence to the fundamental freedoms of the citizen. In giving the Constitution to them, the people had reserved the fundamental rights for themselves.
Article 13, according to the majority view, expressed this limitation on the powers of Parliament. The Parliament could not modify, restrict or impair fundamental freedoms due to this very scheme of the Constitution and the nature of the freedoms granted under it. The judges stated that the fundamental rights were so sacrosanct and transcendental in importance that they could not be restricted even if such a move were to receive unanimous approval of both houses of Parliament. They observed that a Constituent Assembly might be summoned by Parliament for the purpose of amending the fundamental rights if necessary.
In other words, the apex court held that some features of the Constitution lay at its core and required much more than the usual procedures to change them.
The phrase ‘basic structure’ was introduced for the first time by M.K. Nambiar and other counsels while arguing for the petitioners in the Golaknath case, but it was only in 1973 that the concept surfaced in the text of the apex court’s verdict.
Nationalisation of Banks and Abolition of Privy Purses
The opportunity to test parliamentary supremacy presented itself once again when Parliament introduced laws to provide greater access to bank credit for the agricultural sector and ensure equitable distribution of wealth and resources of production and by:
- Nationalising banks
- Derecognising erstwhile princes in a bid to take away their Privy purses, which were promised inperpetuity – as a sop to accede to the Union – at the time of India’s independence.
The Parliament reasoned that it was implementing the Directive Principles of State Policy but the Supreme Court struck down both moves. By now, it was clear that the Supreme Court and Parliament were at loggerheads over the relative position of the fundamental rights vis-à-vis the Directive Principles of State Policy. At one level, the battle was about the supremacy of Parliament vis-à-vis the power of the courts to interpret and uphold the Constitution.
At another level the contention was over the sanctity of property as a fundamental right jealously guarded by an affluent class much smaller than that of the large impoverished masses for whose benefit the Congress Government claimed to implement its socialist development programme.
Through a spate of amendments made between July 1971 and June 1972 the Parliament sought to regain lost ground. It restored for itself the absolute power to amend any part of the Constitution including Part III, dealing with fundamental rights. Even the President was made duty bound to give his assent to any amendment bill passed by both houses of Parliament.
Several curbs on the right property were passed into law. The right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws (Article 14) and the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 were made subordinate to Article 39 (b) & (c) in the Directive Principles of State Policy. Privy purses of erstwhile princes were abolished and an entire category of legislation dealing with land reforms was placed in the Ninth Schedule beyond the scope of judicial review.
Emergence of the Basic Structure Concept- the Kesavanada milestone
Inevitably, the constitutional validity of the amendments was challenged before a full bench of the Supreme Court (thirteen judges). Their verdict can be found in eleven separate judgements. Nine judges signed a summary statement which records the most important conclusions reached by them in this case. Nevertheless, the seminal concept of ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution gained recognition in the majority verdict.
All judges upheld the validity of the Twenty-fourth amendment saying that the Parliament had the power to amend any or all provisions of the Constitution. All signatories to the summary held that the Golaknath case had been decided wrongly and that Article 368 contained both the power and the procedure for amending the Constitution.
However they were clear that an amendment to the Constitution was not the same as a law as understood by Article 13 (2).
It is necessary to point out the subtle difference that exists between two kinds of functions performed by the Indian Parliament:
- It can make laws for the country by exercising its legislative power.
- It can amend the Constitution by exercising its constituent power.
Constituent power is superior to ordinary legislative power. Unlike the British Parliament which is a sovereign body (in the absence of a written constitution), the powers and functions of the Indian Parliament and State legislatures are subject to limitations laid down in the Constitution.
The Constitution does not contain all the laws that govern the country. The Parliament and the state legislatures make laws from time to time on various subjects, within their respective jurisdictions. The general framework for making these laws is provided by the Constitution. Parliament alone is given the power to make changes to this framework under Article 368. Unlike ordinary laws, amendments to constitutional provisions require a special majority vote in Parliament.
Another illustration is useful to demonstrate the difference between Parliament’s constituent power and law making powers. According to Article 21 of the Constitution, no person in the country maybe deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The Constitution does not lay down the details of the procedure as that responsibility is vested with the legislatures and the executive.
The Parliament and the state legislatures make the necessary laws criminalizing offensive activities for which a person may be imprisoned or sentenced to death. The executive lays down the procedure of implementing these laws and the accused person is tried in acourt of law. Changes to these laws may be incorporated by a simple majority vote in the concerned state legislature. There is no need to amend the Constitution in order to incorporate changes to these laws. However, if there is a demand to convert Article 21 into the fundamental right to life by abolishing death penalty, the Constitution may have to be suitably amended by Parliament using its constituent power.
Most importantly, seven of the thirteen judges in the Kesavananda Bharati case, including Chief Justice Sikri who signed the summary statement, declared that Parliament’s constituent power was subject to inherent limitations. The Parliament could not use its amending powers under Article 368 to ‘damage’, ’emasculate’, ‘destroy’, ‘abrogate’, ‘change’ or ‘alter’ the ‘basic structure’ or framework of the Constitution.